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**Theater Engagement Planning: An Interagency Opportunity**

**By**

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**The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy or the Office of the Secretary of Defense.**

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## **Abstract of**

### **THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING: AN INTERAGENCY OPPORTUNITY**

The 1997 National Security Strategy's "imperative of engagement" explicitly cites a range of interagency activities—from diplomacy to military exercises—as necessary to successfully shaping the international environment to deter conflict and promote peace. Accordingly, the Chairman has established the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP), a new type of deliberate plan designed to better focus and manage the U.S. military contribution to regional engagement. The TEP process will require each CINC to develop a strategic concept for regional engagement in his area of responsibility, and to annually update a detailed 5-year implementation program.

The TEP process offers an opportunity to institutionalize the participation of agencies and organizations outside of the Department of Defense into military operational planning, and to encourage a shared interagency planning process for regional engagement. If supported by a standing National Security Council Interagency Working Group (IAWG) on Regional Engagement and a global interagency exercise program for engagement, the TEP process could simplify the management of crosscutting interagency responsibilities. Agency progress toward accomplishing crosscutting tasks identified and approved by the IAWG could be monitored through the strategic planning and performance-monitoring process mandated in Government Performance Results Act of 1993.

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## INTRODUCTION

*"National security preparedness—particularly in this era when domestic and foreign policies are increasingly blurred—crosses agency lines; thus, our approach places a premium on integrated interagency efforts to enhance U.S. security."*

A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1997

Lessons-learned over the past 10 years universally cite the importance of integrating agencies and organizations outside the Department of Defense (DOD) into military operational planning, especially for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations. In October 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff took the first step toward institutionalizing the U.S. military's hard-won interagency experience by approving Interagency Operations During Joint Operations, a comprehensive set of coordination guidelines for commanders-in-chief (CINCs) and other joint commanders.<sup>1</sup>

However, this new joint publication speaks exclusively to planning for and conducting crisis *response* operations. To meet the broader mandate for *shaping* missions directed by the current National Security Strategy, the Chairman has established a new type of deliberate plan—the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP)—to harmonize peacetime engagement activities across different theaters. After an initial test period, DOD will use this new family of 5-year, regionally oriented plans as a framework for globally integrating military engagement activities.<sup>2</sup>

The new TEP family of plans will list and rank CINC-proposed military engagement activities within the context of a regional strategic concept developed by the CINC, but approved by the Chairman against a set of national "shaping" goals developed in concert with the interagency community. In practical terms, the TEP process will give the Chairman and

the Secretary of Defense a "means-to-ends" method of evaluating CINC proposals for high-tempo military engagement activities, and for establishing associated resource priorities.

However, the TEP concept also offers a potential in the interagency arena that transcends balanced resourcing. By providing a formal, routine process for establishing an integrated set of worldwide shaping and regional engagement priorities, the TEP process can encourage a *shared interagency planning process* at the operational level.

### **WHY A NEW DELIBERATE PLAN?**

During the run-up to the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy undertook a comprehensive review of overseas presence requirements and issues. The intention was to ensure the resources committed to presence were consistent with national priorities in the region—and to identify overseas commitments that were potentially excess to the emerging defense strategy. To make sure everything was considered, the definition of "presence" was made as broad as possible—from forward-stationed troops, to prepositioned stocks, to naval deployments, to joint and combined military exercises, to mil-to-mil contacts.<sup>3</sup> At about the same time, the Joint Staff was working to create a notional "baseline engagement force" in order to get a clearer historical picture of how many U.S. forces worldwide were engaged routinely in engagement or crisis-response operations.<sup>4</sup> Both the overseas presence study and the baseline engagement force analysis were intended to form one point of departure for the formulation of a new defense strategy. Planners hoped to find relatively painless ways to increase spending on military readiness and procurement, without undercutting essential warfighting forces or technology.

Not unpredictably, the overseas presence study team found the CINCs and key military leaders believed decisive regional engagement was imperative to both their peacetime and wartime military missions. And generally from the CINCs' viewpoint, decisive engagement meant more—not fewer—resources for regional military forces and activities.<sup>5</sup> Somewhat less predictably, the Joint Staff effort to establish a baseline engagement force found it almost impossible to reliably identify annual levels of engagement among the different regions overseen by the theater CINCs. With the exception of forces deployed specifically under an operations order, there was no common definition of an engagement activity. Each Service defined and tracked engagement data differently.

This *ad hoc* and imprecisely monitored approach to engagement did not mean DOD was not performing effectively. Over the years since the 1993 Bottom-Up Review—the first formal post-cold war defense strategy statement—several CINCs responsible for "non-war" theaters had stepped out smartly to establish formal regional strategies to define and justify the role of military activities under the Administration's new imperative of engagement and enlargement.<sup>6</sup> Especially in the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the CINC's campaign-plan approach to regional engagement brought a certain coherence to the chaotic counter-narcotics initiative by defining it within the context of a broad peacetime strategy of democratization and stability for the region. CINCSOUTH aggressively involved the interagency community, ambassadors, and country teams in finding common operational activities that would bring strategic success in the Latin American region.<sup>7</sup> In the European Command (EUCOM), several efforts which have become the bedrock of the Administration's Partnership-for-Peace program, such as the Marshall Center, began as CINC initiatives to re-define the U.S. military's post-cold-war regional relationships with its former enemies and

likely new friends and allies.<sup>8</sup> However, each regional strategy defined engagement in different terms—each set different priorities for Service support and involvement in their region. Competing requests for engagement support generally were de-conflicted by the Services based strictly on affordability concerns.

As the new defense strategy began to take shape during the QDR, it became clear that better policy guidance was needed to help both CINCs and Services understand and manage their roles for peacetime engagement. At the resource level, the impetus for clearer policy guidance was *readiness*: Services warned that continuing high operating tempos were eroding readiness, yet the demand for rotational deployments for exercises and other engagement activities remained high. As a signal that better force management processes were to come, the Chairman proposed a partial solution for reducing tempo stresses in the final QDR Report—a 15% reduction in the man-days associated with "discretionary" joint exercises by 1998, with even more joint and Service exercise reductions to be negotiated with the CINCs over the coming year.<sup>9</sup> The QDR report described how DOD would apply a Global Military Force Policy to allocate low density/high demand assets across competing theater priorities for peacetime engagement. The report also described plans for a global resourcing program designed to share the burdens of response among the forces deployed in all theaters—to include exploring the use of contractors to ease the burden of some peacetime support missions.<sup>10</sup> The implicit message was that managing theater-specific engagement from a global perspective would help prevent such commitments from competing directly with Service priorities for basic readiness and training.

It also was clear, however, that resolving the disconnect between the high demand for engagement activities and the pressure to relieve operating tempo stresses would extend far

beyond the relatively modest burden imposed by joint exercises (which constitute less than a quarter of all scheduled regional military activities). In order for a global force management policy or resourcing strategy to work, DOD needed a mechanism that would identify potential conflicts far enough in advance to allow discrete cross-leveling of Service and CINC operational and resource priorities, yet not constrain CINC initiative on engagement simply based on dollar concerns.

### **THE "FAMILY OF PLANS" CONCEPT**

Immediately following the QDR, the Chairman proposed using the deliberate planning process to link strategic objectives for national security preparedness to the type and scope of engagement activities deemed necessary by the CINC to achieve his regional security objectives. By using the existing plans process, the theater CINC would retain the lead for military engagement activities in his region, yet the established review process would ensure global regional goals were integrated into a single, sustainable "engagement campaign" matched directly to the National Security Strategy and the Secretary's policy priorities. This new plan could then be used to further refine both policy and resource priorities for engagement within the existing Joint Strategic Planning Process (JSPS) and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).<sup>11</sup>

The TEP concept is intended to bring together all interagency players with some stake in using military engagement to shape the international security environment at both the strategic and operational level.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, the process was designed with two discrete steps, each with its own review protocol. During Step 1, the Chairman and Secretary of Defense will review CINC-proposed strategic concepts for regional military engagement



against a set of national goals developed by DOD in concert with interagency stakeholders. The review conducted during Step 2 will ensure CINC-developed operational plans for implementing each regional strategy are globally sustainable within DOD.

The following sections outline key aspects of the TEP concept as it is currently structured, then suggest how this basic concept could be strengthened to encourage more formal coordination on interagency activities planned in support of national regional engagement goals.

### **STEP 1: TEP STRATEGIC CONCEPTS**

Like other deliberate plans, policy guidance for the theater engagement plan will be developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, working with the Joint Staff and the interagency community. For the 1998 test of the TEP concept, specific strategic goals for regional engagement were taken from the results of the QDR overseas presence study, as coordinated with the National Security Council (NSC); NSC-approved goals were included in an annex to the Secretary's 1998 Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).<sup>13</sup> In the future, DOD will convene an NSC interagency working group to coordinate with the Department of State on TEP regional objectives (but not to review or approve the final plans).<sup>14</sup>

Each CPG update will direct the geographic CINCs to prepare a theater engagement plan for the Chairman's review and approval.<sup>15</sup> Next, using the broad regional goals published in the CPG, the Chairman's Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) will direct the CINCs to focus on specific engagement planning tasks in the near term.<sup>16</sup> In general, the JSCP will tell the CINCs to assume forces as outlined in the most recent "Forces For" document, or at levels historically rotated or temporarily deployed into theater for engagement activities.<sup>17</sup> The JSCP will also ask the CINCs to identify interagency

participation—either as *supporting* or *supported* players—needed to maintain or improve on activity levels of past years.<sup>18</sup>

The product of this first step in the TEP development phase will be the theater, regional and country *strategic* objectives for peacetime engagement in each area overseen by a geographic CINC. Each CINC's TEP *Strategic Concept* will include an associated, macro-level estimate of the resources (forces, prepositioned stocks, exercises) needed to execute the strategy over the next 5 years. The concepts are to address interagency support requirements, but *formal* interagency involvement in TEP development is solely at the CINC's discretion<sup>19</sup>—although CINCs are generally expected to consult with their regional ambassadors, country teams, and other key interagency advisors.

After the TEP Strategic Concepts are completed, the Chairman will review each *individually* to ensure compliance with the JSCP, and together *as a family of plans* to ensure they represent an integrated and sustainable global engagement military strategy. Where the plans as a package do not meet national goals, the Chairman will suggest changes to achieve the global priorities for engagement as established in the National Security Strategy and the CPG.<sup>20</sup>

## **STEP 2: TEP ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITY ANNEX**

Only after the Chairman approves the TEP family of Strategic Concepts will the CINCs be asked to prepare the associated operational details. The TEP Engagement Activity Annex will outline resources necessary to sustain the plan over the next 5 years, set specific *operational* objectives in each category of military engagement, link available forces to sequenced and time-phased tasks, and identify time-phased transportation requirements. In

some cases, activities will demand large, long-term resource commitments (e.g., Bosnia); some will extend elements of an operation that may have begun as a crisis response task (e.g., embassy security).<sup>21</sup> Figure 1 is an example format for a TEP Engagement Annex.

### EXERCISES (Region or Country)

Activity	Authority	Other Participants	Forces/ Capabilities	Resources	Duration	Objectives

### MILITARY CONTACTS

Activity	Aggregate Number	Timeframe	Objectives
Senior officer visits			
Counterpart visits			
Ship port visits			
Conferences			
Staff talks (bilateral and multilateral)			
Personnel exchange programs			
Unit exchange programs			
Other			

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Activity	Aggregate Number	Timeframe	Objectives
IMET			
Enhanced IMET			
FMS			
FMF			
Direct sales			
EDA			

**FIGURE 1. Engagement Activity Annex: Sample formats<sup>22</sup>**

Although the CINC may develop a plan for any engagement activity, at a minimum the TEP Annex will include a detailed 5-year program for both combined exercises and foreign military interaction, to include *combined training* not sponsored by DOD; *combined*

*education*, to include recommendations on how school spaces should be allotted among foreign defense personnel in the region; *military contacts*, such as ship port visits; *security assistance* priorities for funds or classroom space; and *planned civic and humanitarian assistance* activities and exercises.<sup>23</sup>

The Chairman will review the TEP Engagement Activity Annexes as he did the Strategic Concepts—*individually* and together as a *family of plans*. This second, operationally focused review will ensure the plans are sustainable in the aggregate. The goal is to meet CINC needs without imposing unrealistic bills or tempo-management problems on the Services. And because this second review will be completed in July, the Chairman can propose force or resource alternatives for either the program or budget reviews based on information developed through the TEP process. A July end-date also gives DOD time to formally coordinate any interagency support requirements with the budget development cycles of the other U.S. agencies, which generally complete their budget submissions in late spring or early summer. (Although, depending on the level of interagency coordination done independently by each CINC, many of the TEP-based interagency requirements may have already been passed through individual agency chains.) The process also dovetails with the Chairman's annual Joint Exercise conference, so CINC staffs and other key players can cross-level commitments and resources before the TEP Annex is formally submitted to the Chairman for review and approval.<sup>24</sup>

When the engagement annexes are complete and approved, the Chairman will send the TEP package—both the Strategic Concepts and the 5-year implementation plans—to the Office of the Secretary for a final policy review. The Chairman will also offer the Secretary his personal assessment of the overall quality of the planning effort, highlight strengths and

weaknesses—and recommend where further policy guidance may be warranted. Once approved by the Chairman, the TEP Strategic Concepts remain in force until revised by the theater CINC or superseded; TEP annexes must be updated and the planning year extended annually.<sup>25</sup>

## **BRIDGING THE INTERAGENCY 'CULTURE GAP'**

By establishing simple, consistent terms for military activities related to engagement, and a clear roadmap of activities worldwide, the TEP is "transportable" as a planning tool to agencies outside of DOD. The TEP will define DOD's goals for military engagement in clear, consistent terms. A common purpose is the first necessary building block to successful interagency cooperation—it is critically important to define *issues* in terms that are understood across agency lines.<sup>26</sup>

The TEP process can compile a common global lexicon of engagement. To do this, the Chairman must ensure that interagency activities included in the TEP are described in consistent terms across regions, so the links to national engagement goals are clearly understood by participating non-defense agencies. More important, TEP goals for interagency coordination must be realistic, recognize the fundamental differences between defense and non-defense organizations, and directly plan to overcome or mitigate those differences as necessary to bring the interagency players closer to a shared vision of success. Specifically, TEP planners must work to ensure unity of effort by overcoming common barriers to interagency communications: differing modes *of planning, measures of effectiveness, and lines of authority.*

## DIFFERENT PLANNING MODES

Defense and non-defense agencies approach planning from fundamentally different perspectives. The reasons are not particularly mysterious. First, since the PPBS was adopted in the early sixties, DOD has used a planning system that projects activities and resources, in great detail, over 5 or 6 years and beyond. No other agency in government routinely provides Congress with itemized resource plans for more than 1 year into the future. In addition, the defense mission revolves around preparing for a range of potential crisis scenarios, maintaining proficiency in skills peculiar to the tasks of war, and rehearsing complex activities against a range of notional plans. In contrast, most non-defense agencies plan to *execute* near-term objectives in *real time*. Such near-term plans tend to focus on changing the pace, scope and detail of daily operations—not, as the DOD does, on fundamentally surging or transforming operations on short notice.<sup>27</sup>

Second, DOD is larger, more complex than other agencies—in fact, its annual budget exceeds that of all the other U.S. agencies combined. With more than 16% of the nation's discretionary income devoted to defense and more than 1.3 million men and women in the armed forces, establishing doctrinal organizational relationships, lines of command authority, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the peacetime and wartime missions is a management imperative.

Management is generally less complicated in other agencies, many of which have a narrower mission focus and far smaller spans of control. Even relatively large and disparate organizations, like State or the Department of Commerce, generally have no formal, long-term planning processes at the operational level. In most non-defense agencies, planning is

often consensus-based and abstract; few agency models follow the military's operational art model, and fewer still follow an institutional ends-ways-means construct for planning.<sup>28</sup>

CINCs and supporting TEP planners must be realistic about the interagency planning environment. On average, non-defense agencies are much more limited than DOD in the discretionary resources—staff and funding—they can devote to non-agency activities. *Interagency activities listed in the TEP Engagement Annex should show evidence of formal coordination with agency counterparts*, including an indication of agency commitment to the activity proposed. Planners should be especially cautious about indicating interagency participation in efforts which are covered by the 5-year window for the TEP Annex, but which may extend beyond the interagency planning window. Because the TEP Annex will be used not only to gauge performance based on past plans, but as a point of departure for future analysis, the activity schedule should be constrained by what can be *practically* expected to be executed outside of the Department of Defense.

### DIFFERENT MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

Every agency has different measures of effectiveness.<sup>29</sup> These measures can differ sharply, even though overall end-state goals for defense and non-defense agencies can be the same—mainly because the defense and non-defense agencies develop tests for effectiveness within separate technical or political stovepipes. (These differences can show up in startling ways at the tactical level: during Rwandan operations, the United States provided the same daily water ration to refugees as provided to U.S. soldiers; unfortunately, the U.S. ration was six times less than the amount prescribed by UN guidelines.<sup>30</sup>) However, the very differences that exist in the interagency community are the ones created by the checks-and-

balance nature of the political process.<sup>31</sup> Non-defense agencies especially tend to bring to the table different weights for different issues, in reflection of the range of political perspectives in the Administration that they represent.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, the solution is not to make non-defense agencies look like DOD—or vice versa—but to establish common ground so their respective bureaucracies can communicate on issues of common interest to both.

The TEP will allow DOD to speak to the interagency community with a single voice. Using the TEP process, DOD can project the nature and frequency of interagency events vital to the success of military engagement activities. The TEP can define terms and priorities of support—number of exercises, number and seniority of staff exchanges—within the context of how the activity will affect the shared goal of successful engagement. The TEP will provide a framework for selective interagency planning, within issue-defined or functional stovepipes, such as crisis-response planning. Within such a framework, DOD and non-defense agency planners can identify specific interagency commonalities across regions.

Over time, the Chairman could use the TEP to highlight where the community could benefit from SOPs or memoranda of agreement. Especially where crisis-response planning is involved, the TEP process can help the Administration focus on areas where common procedures must be developed to ease coordination during emergency operations.

### **DIFFERENT LINES OF AUTHORITY**

Although the National Security Council is charged with coordinating interagency activities,<sup>33</sup> on a practical level there is no standing mechanism for overseeing integrated interagency operations at the tactical or operational level.<sup>34</sup> Performance monitoring is left largely to each independent agency. Even being designated by the President as a lead agency



for an interagency coordination does not carry absolute operational authority.<sup>35</sup> And when the interagency problem is not part of an ongoing crisis, it can be difficult to get agreement among defense and non-defense organizations on how (or whether) to pursue planning.<sup>36</sup>

The issue becomes even more complex when the concept of integrating interagency activities in support of military regional engagement strategies is exported into a CINC's area of responsibility. Within the U.S. government, the Department of State has the lead for executing foreign policy.<sup>37</sup> Within each country, the country ambassador directs all activities, including military activities for forces not directly assigned to the theater CINC; interagency working groups headed by one of the six regionally oriented Assistant Secretaries of State integrate State's regional strategies among different countries.<sup>38</sup> Somewhere within this patchwork of focus and authorities, the CINC and his planning staff must find ways to coordinate strategy development, operational planning, and execution.

Although the NSC's charter is to guide interagency policy development and coordinated activities, its focus is policy—specific strategic and operational details are left to each independent agency, with their separate budget authorization and appropriation processes and different modes of congressional oversight.<sup>39</sup> The TEP process now engages the NSC interagency community at the level where the NSC works best—in establishing policy. However, over time, the feedback loop provided through the Chairman on the resource and execution issues linked to TEP will allow DOD to frame operational questions within the NSC interagency coordination process that will better define NSC coordination requirements for non-defense agencies with regional engagement responsibilities. This could be the beginning of a shared interagency planning process for regional engagement—and should be a long-term goal for the TEP process.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The TEP family of plans extends the umbrella of deliberate planning across the full range of *shape* and *respond* missions of the new defense strategy.<sup>40</sup> It responds to needs identified during the 1997 QDR to size and justify both forward presence and military regional engagement activities against global national security goals. Besides providing a basis for evaluating performance, managing resources and projecting future requirements, the TEP family of plans provides a framework for interagency planning and coordination. If the TEP concept is applied broadly within the interagency community, it offers a unique and valuable opportunity for maturing interagency strategic and operational planning for regional engagement. The TEP family of plans also will develop common goals, a common language, and a shared timeframe for regional engagement activities, and provide a point of departure for establishing a consistent planning framework in the interagency community.

This first round of tests for the TEP concept also provides an opportunity to further strengthen the TEP approach in three ways: by establishing a standing NSC-sponsored *interagency working group*, by developing a global *interagency exercise plan* for engagement, and by using the Government Performance Results Act of 1993 to encourage *shared interagency planning*.

### RECOMMENDATION: ESTABLISH AN IAWG ON REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Any number of recent after-action reports from military operations in Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda argue that the NSC interagency process does not always work well—or at least does not provide the kind of authoritative, quick-response leadership that crisis operations

demand. However, waiting passively for a crisis to spur action is no way to pursue an improved interagency process, and may eventually lead to disaster.<sup>41</sup>

The recent initiatives in counter-narcotics and combating terrorism show that a properly structured interagency process can be effective. Without arguing whether those interagency efforts have achieved an acceptable level of success, there is no doubt that a coordinated approach to combating drugs and terrorism has changed how the interagency community operates in those arenas.

The TEP process has similar potential for changing the paradigm for peacetime national security activities. The mechanics of the TEP process already are structured along timelines that feed the existing DOD and agency decision processes. The TEP concept also takes an important first step by involving the NSC interagency process during the formulation of strategic goals for regional engagement. However, the process is probably ready even now to go farther. Since the key to success in interagency coordination is to ask the right questions of the right people at the right time in the decision process, and to communicate in terms that are understood across interagency "cultural" lines,<sup>42</sup> a standing Interagency Working Group (IAWG) on Regional Engagement could stimulate the sort of collegial interagency discussion that can be the beginning of a common lexicon of regional engagement.<sup>43</sup>

Ideally, a standing IAWG on Regional Engagement could be chartered by the NSC to draw those non-defense agencies with potential roles in military peacetime or crisis-response operations into the TEP planning process. The IAWG could be built around two action-officer-level working groups—one to oversee the development of *national goals* for

engagement, the other to use requirements identified during the TEP process to define and coordinate a global *interagency exercise plan* for engagement.

#### **RECOMMENDATION: DEVELOP A GLOBAL INTERAGENCY EXERCISE PLAN**

Outside of actual crisis operations, the most effective proven tool for cross-training civilian and military organizations is an aggressive exercise program. Whenever the military have been able to gather the interagency community for regional engagement exercises, the results have been strong and positive. High-level role-playing and gaming is one of the best tools for improving decision process in general, and interagency coordination in particular.<sup>44</sup> A series of counterdrug exercises conducted by SOUTHCOM and including senior interagency officials, country teams, and ambassadors, was materially influential in refining interagency goals for counterdrug activities.<sup>45</sup> Especially useful was the opportunity for players to experiment with concepts of operations far afield from routine operations, and to talk one-on-one with counterparts in the military and other organizations.<sup>46</sup> EUCOM's Agile Lion exercise series also focuses on interagency players, and has clarified the difficult policy issues to be faced by the U.S. leadership if it has to consider deploying U.S. personnel to a radiological crisis overseas.<sup>47</sup>

In general, agencies are not eager to exercise with the military.<sup>48</sup> Some of the reluctance is political, but most defer participation because day-to-day operations take precedence for time and funding.<sup>49</sup> However, when the mission is focused and the terms of success are defined across agency lines, NSC coordination has some measure of effectiveness in encouraging participation in interagency exercises. For example, the NSC IAWG on Combating Terrorism, lead by State, oversees activities of more than 40 federal

agencies in areas ranging from research and development, to international consequence management, to transportation security—to interagency exercises. The working group's charter, and that of its two main subgroups on counterterrorism and counterproliferation, is to reach consensus on policy and operational matters. Recommendations for action are made through the Deputies Committee or through the National Security advisor directly to the President.<sup>50</sup> Between 1994 and 1997, the working group oversaw 30 interagency exercises; 25 more are planned through 1999. The FBI has revised its crisis management plans directly in response to exercise results, and agencies in general report better coordination and intelligence flow.<sup>51</sup>

If encouraged by an NSC-sponsored IAWG on Regional Engagement, the 5-year TEP plan of activities can begin to tie-up loose ends from the lessons learned from recent operations into a series of coordinated, mutually supporting follow-on actions or exercises. TEP planners should focus on areas where experience has shown there is a shortfall in crisis coordination, or where the need for interagency SOPs are clear. A global interagency exercise program for regional engagement also could encourage non-defense agencies to take the lead as often as possible in SOP development, and to become key agents in designing civil-military exercises.

#### **RECOMMENDATION: USE GPRA TO ENCOURAGE INTERAGENCY PLANNING**

Outside of the NSC interagency process, the closest thing the interagency community has to a shared planning process is mandated under the Government Performance Results Act of 1993. The GPRA requires both 3-year strategic plans and annual performance plans from most U.S. government agencies. The law was designed to give legislators the oversight and

data-reporting mechanisms they needed to uncover waste and inefficiency in Federal programs, in part by systematically holding Federal agencies accountable to specific standards of performance.<sup>52</sup> The law also requires agencies to consult with Congress on the content of their strategic plans.

If approached cautiously, the TEP family of plans could focus interagency attention on a select set of cross-cutting engagement programs which all participating agencies must include in their GPRA performance plans as proof of their support to the national security shaping and engagement mission. In addition, each agency's GPRA strategic plan would echo goals approved by a standing NSC-sponsored IAWG on Regional Engagement.

The obvious danger is that exposing TEP planning details to direct congressional scrutiny could disrupt the interagency community's associated lines of authority and control. But if managed carefully within the NSC interagency forum, linking the strategic direction of the TEP and the compliance mandate of the GPRA could offer the Administration a powerful tool for consistently integrating national security goals and near-term activities for regional engagement. However, all agencies would have to concur on their contributions to the military portion of regional engagement, and reflect those contributions consistently in their GPRA strategy documents and performance plans. There also would likely be a certain amount of reciprocity required. DOD's commitments to interagency engagement activities would need to be reflected in the Department's GPRA documentation. Finally, all agencies would need to be prepared to defend and justify their crosscutting programs independently throughout the budget review and approval process. If crosscutting programs are carefully selected and well coordinated, the GPRA could become an effective vehicle to help define and describe regional engagement priorities within an interagency context.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Joints Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-08), Volumes I and II (Washington, DC: 1996).

<sup>2</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Theater Engagement Planning (CJCSM 3113.01) (Washington DC: 1998). A TEP is prepared by each theater CINC, and by Executive Agents designated by the Secretary for countries unassigned in the Unified Command Plan. In some cases, the Joint Staff will prepare the TEP for an unassigned country.

<sup>3</sup> Author's recollections of draft briefings by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Office of the Joint Staff, Policy and Plans Directorate, Fall 1997.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Neither the European Command (EUCOM) nor the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) was responsible for a Major Regional Contingency (MRC) under the two-MRC warfight strategy.

<sup>7</sup> William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 29-30.

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Congress, House National Security Committee, Statement of General George A. Joulwan, Commander-in-Chief U.S. European Command, Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, 104<sup>th</sup> Congress (Washington, DC: 1996).

<sup>9</sup> William Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1997), Section VI.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., Section VI.

<sup>11</sup> Theater Engagement Planning, A-1 and A-2.

<sup>12</sup> Daryl Hausmann, <daryl.hausmann@js.pentagon.mil> "TEP," personal email communication with author (27 April 1997).

<sup>13</sup> David M. Shilling, Director for Requirements, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, Requirements and Counterproliferation, telephone conversation with author, 26 March 1998.

<sup>14</sup> Louis Geanuleas <geanulea@osd.pentagon.mil> "Theater Engagement," personal communication with author (11 May 1998).

<sup>15</sup> David M. Shilling.

<sup>16</sup> Daryl Hausmann, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Policy and Planning Directorate, Theater Engagement Planning, briefing, March 1998.

<sup>17</sup> David M. Shilling.

<sup>18</sup> David M. Shilling.

<sup>19</sup> Theater Engagement Planning, A-2. Services, Defense Agencies and supporting CINCs are required to provide the information necessary to help the supported CINC prepare his TEP.

<sup>20</sup> Louis Geanuleas.

<sup>21</sup> Theater Engagement Planning, A-3.

<sup>22</sup> Paul Odell, instructor, Joint Military Operations faculty, U.S. Naval War College, interview by author, 26 April 1998, Newport, RI., after-class conversation.

<sup>23</sup> Theater Engagement Planning, C-10 and C-11.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, A-11 through A-13

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, A-1 through A-13.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, A-1 through B-7

<sup>27</sup> David H. Huntoon, Jr., "Winning the Peace: Achieving the Commander-in-Chief's Vision in U.S. Military Interventions through Institutional Reforms in the Interagency Process," Working Papers in International Studies (Unpublished Research Paper, Stanford University, the Hoover Institution, California: 1995), 33.

<sup>28</sup> Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996), 52-53.

<sup>29</sup> Mark L. Curry, "The Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy," (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Report Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1994), 16

<sup>30</sup> Warren Lowman, "Operations Other Than War: An Interagency Imperative," (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1994), 10

<sup>31</sup> Jennifer Morrison Taw, Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Arroyo Center, 1997), 12 and 21.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>33</sup> Huntoon, 33.

<sup>34</sup> Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume II, A-K-1, A-K-2, and A-K-3.

<sup>35</sup> Mendel, 21

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 25

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 25 and 85.

<sup>38</sup> Robert C. Shaw, "A Model for Inter-Agency Coordination" (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, Paper, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1996), 21.

<sup>39</sup> Curry, 6.



<sup>40</sup> Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume II, A-K-1, A-K-2, and A-K-3.

<sup>41</sup> Hausmann, Theater Engagement Planning.

<sup>42</sup> George T. Raach and Ilana Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process," Joint Forces Quarterly (Washington, DC: Summer 1995), 12-13.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 13

<sup>44</sup> Huntoon, 33.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 31.

<sup>46</sup> Mendel, 65.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 65

<sup>48</sup> Conference Report for Headquarters EUCOM: Agile Lion—International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (n.p.: 1997), 4-2.

<sup>49</sup> Taw, 42.

<sup>50</sup> Mendel, 62.

<sup>51</sup> U.S. Government Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (Washington, DC: 1997), 2 and 22-23.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>53</sup> "Government Performance Results Act," Bills of the 103<sup>rd</sup> Congress at "Thomas—U.S. Congress on the Internet," <<http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c103:4:./temp/~c103WEQMG5:e671>> (Washington, DC: 26 April 1998).

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